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HONORS, AWARDS, AND THE CATHOLIC
MORAL TRADITION
KAREN STOHRt
For some time now, Catholic colleges and universities have
been finding themselves under increasing pressure to ensure that
their choices of speakers and honorees conform to a certain
set of standards. The controversy over President Obama's
commencement speech and honorary degree at the University of
Notre Dame in 2009 was especially public but not especially new.
In 2004, the U.S. Catholic Bishops issued a statement containing
the following remark: "The Catholic community and Catholic
institutions should not honor those who act in defiance of our
fundamental moral principles. They should not be given awards,
honors or platforms which would suggest support for their
actions."' Since that time, various groups have been pressing the
issue from one direction or another, with particular urgency
when the honoree in question holds pro-choice views or supports
political candidates who do. The list of honorees to whom
objections have been made is quite long and includes low-level
politicians and activists as well as high-profile figures like
President Obama and Justice Stephen Breyer, who received an
ethics award from Fordham University School of Law in 2008.2
I take it to be obvious that there should be at least some
constraints on the choice of speakers and honorees at Catholic
institutions and, moreover, that those constraints should be
based in the Catholic moral framework. But of course, saying
only this much amounts to saying very little at all. In this
t Karen Stohr is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University
and Senior Research Scholar in Georgetown's Kennedy Institute of Ethics. She has a
B.A. from the University of Notre Dame and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her primary research areas are Aristotelian virtue
ethics, Kantian ethics, and Catholic medical ethics.
1 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE
(2004), available at http://www.uscc.org/bishops/catholicsinpoliticallife.shtml.
2 One of the primary missions of the Cardinal Newman Society is the
identification of such speakers, and its activities in support of this mission cast a
very broad net.
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particular debate, the devil really is in the details. Although the
quoted line from the bishops' statement has often been
interpreted as presenting definitive reason for disqualifying
particular speakers and honorees, the statement itself is vague
on crucial points. What counts as "honoring," what counts as
"acting in defiance" of fundamental moral principles, and what
kinds of honors and speaking opportunities "suggest support" for
those actions? Answering these questions requires attention to
both the relevant principles in Catholic moral teaching and the
nuances of their application in particular circumstances.
The philosophical subtlety of the Catholic moral tradition is
one of its greatest strengths, but its finely wrought distinctions
have tended to generate confusion, annoyance, and impatience
among Catholics and non-Catholics alike. At stake in the debate
over honors at Catholic institutions are philosophical concepts
like intention and cooperation, concepts on which a great deal of
the Catholic moral framework depends. Those who dismiss
appeal to such concepts in these cases as mere casuistry are,
wittingly or not, setting aside a huge swath of the Catholic
intellectual tradition and depriving themselves of powerful
argumentative tools.
As it turns out, arguments about the permissibility of
honoring certain individuals at Catholic institutions will
inevitably be very complicated, involving many different moral
layers. Because of this complexity, I will limit my discussion to a
fairly narrow set of cases; namely, those involving (1) politicians
who are (2) not Catholic and (3) whose public record reflects a
pro-choice stance. My restriction to pro-choice honorees probably
requires little explanation; it is certainly the issue that generates
the most controversy when it comes to Catholic institutions. The
Catholic Church, of course, accepts the principle that abortion,
defined as the intentional killing of an embryo or fetus,3 is both
intrinsically and-more significantly-gravely wrong. Moreover,
this principle is supposed to be a truth accessible through the use
of natural human reason and, hence, is something that non-
Catholics can also be morally responsible for accepting or
I recognize that use of the words "embryo" and "fetus" may imply that abortion
is not the killing of a human person and hence, begging the question against the pro-
life side. I do not intend that to be the case, but in my view, there is no terminology
available that does not beg the question. I employ these medical terms as the best of
a set of bad options.
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rejecting. This matters. As I will show, opposition to pro-choice
honorees tends to presuppose that such honorees have at least
one indefensible moral view and that having such a view is a
failing serious enough to preclude them from being honored for
unrelated accomplishments. This presupposition is not often
articulated, but it does quite a lot of work behind the scenes and,
hence, needs to be addressed explicitly.
I focus on politicians because they present special problems
for Catholic institutions by virtue of the fact that they, unlike
many other honorees, have public records that make plain their
views on controversial moral issues, including abortion. By
contrast, an institution is unlikely to know what stance a Nobel
laureate or celebrated novelist takes on abortion or embryonic
stem cell research, and it may well have little incentive to find
out. I am not suggesting that it is necessarily unfair to hold
politicians to a different standard than scientists or authors;
indeed, insofar as the arguments opposing pro-choice honorees
rely on concerns about scandal, the public nature of the honoree's
stance is a relevant consideration. Still, the discrepancy is worth
noting if the institution's aim is to develop a consistent policy
about speakers and honorees.
I focus on non-Catholics because I take it that Catholic
commencement speakers are subject to a second set of norms
based on their status as Catholics, norms that do not apply to
non-Catholics. A Catholic politician who is publicly pro-choice
could be opposed on the grounds that he is a Catholic in bad
standing with the Church and Catholic institutions should not
confer honors on Catholics in bad standing. I set this issue aside
as one requiring theological expertise that I lack. Obviously, a
non-Catholic cannot be opposed on the basis that she is a bad
Catholic or refuses to accept the teaching authority of the
Catholic Church. If there are reasons to oppose a non-Catholic,
pro-choice commencement speaker, they will have to be grounded
in something else. My interest in this paper is that something
else.
Let me add a few further restrictions. I will assume that the
pressing issue with commencement speakers is not the speech
itself but rather the honorary degree that ordinarily accompanies
a commencement speech. I do not think that this distinction
matters much in the end, but since at least some people object
only or primarily to the honorary degree, I will focus on that. I
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will also assume that the potential speaker has accomplishments
that would otherwise warrant honoring by a Catholic institution,
such as a robust public commitment to ending poverty. Finally, I
will assume that the potential speaker would not in any way be
advocating for a pro-choice position during her speech or the
surrounding commencement activities. Thus, the speech would
not be a platform in the sense described by the bishops in the
quote above.
What would justify opposition to a non-Catholic
commencement speaker who has accomplishments and
commitments worthy of honor but who also happens to be pro-
choice? There are several possibilities. Among the most obvious
is the claim that by giving such a person an honorary degree, a
Catholic institution would give scandal to the faithful, and there
is a moral duty not to give scandal.
Scandal has a technical meaning within theology that I will
not attempt to spell out in detail. But let me just say that if the
primary objection to pro-choice commencement speakers is that
honoring them will give scandal in the technical sense, it is not a
terribly compelling one. Let us consider the definition of scandal
as set out in the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
Scandal is an attitude or behavior which leads another to do
evil. The person who gives scandal becomes his neighbor's
tempter. He damages virtue and integrity; he may even draw
his brother into spiritual death. Scandal is a grave offense if by
deed or omission another is deliberately led into a grave
offense.'
The sin of giving scandal is essentially the sin of corrupting
people by causing them to have false beliefs on matters of moral
importance, beliefs that may lead them to act in morally bad
ways. Importantly, the criterion for something's giving scandal
is not simply that someone feels scandalized by it. Certainly,
many Catholics felt scandalized by President Obama's honorary
degree, but that does not prove that giving the degree in fact
gave scandal in the technical sense. This is evident enough if one
reflects on the fact that there were undoubtedly Catholics who
felt scandalized when Catholic institutions opened their doors to
African-Americans and women. Obviously, it does not follow that
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH l 2284 (2d ed. 1997).
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those institutions were in fact giving scandal. If anything, they
were leading people away from sinful beliefs and actions based
on those beliefs.
In order for a Catholic institution to give scandal by
honoring someone pro-choice, it would need to be the case that
the honor produced actual, deleterious effects on the beliefs or
actions of those witnessing it or hearing of it. Such effects might
include the sowing of confusion among those unaware of the
Church's actual teaching, the weakening of their moral
convictions, or an increase in the likelihood that they will engage
in immoral behavior. I assume that bestowing an honorary
degree on a pro-choice speaker is not going to encourage
members of the audience to either provide or procure an abortion
when they would not otherwise do so. The more plausible
argument is that, in honoring someone who is publicly pro-choice,
a Catholic institution gives the impression that it does not take
abortion to be gravely wrong and that this will mislead people
about a moral truth. Whether this argument is convincing
depends on the likelihood that bestowing a degree will have that
effect. If the objection to honoring a pro-choice speaker is that it
will weaken the moral convictions of the faithful, then we need
some reason for thinking that this will actually be the result.
I will grant that Catholic educational institutions have a
duty to avoid giving scandal. I will further grant that it is an
especially pressing duty in virtue of their teaching mission.
What I doubt is that bestowing an honorary degree on someone
who holds pro-choice views always, or even usually, gives scandal
in the sense set forth in the Catechism. It is hard to believe that
any reasonably perceptive Catholic could easily be misled about
the Church's stated position on abortion, which is about as clear
and consistent as a moral position could be. It is even less
plausible to think that people opposed to abortion would be
inclined to change their minds by the bestowal of the degree. If
the institution is clear about the accomplishments for which the
speaker is being honored, and if those accomplishments are in
the service of ends promoted by the Church, then it seems
unlikely that the honorary degree will actually sow confusion
among the faithful about the wrongness of abortion or the
Church's stance on it.
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But even if honoring a pro-choice politician does not fulfill
the technical criteria for giving scandal, there may be some other
sense in which it might be plausible to call it scandalous. The
most likely sense-and indeed, the one that I think prevailed
during the debate over President Obama's presence at Notre
Dame-is that there is something morally reprehensible about
creating such a public association between a Catholic educational
institution and a pro-choice politician. Perhaps Catholic
institutions have a moral responsibility to distance themselves
from individuals who are widely known to hold views at odds
with central moral teachings of the Church. In this sense, it
would be the association itself that is scandalous, not the actual
effects of bestowing a degree.
This dilemma is an instance of a general moral problem
known as the "dirty hands" problem or, alternatively, as the
problem of "keeping one's hands clean." The reference, of course,
is to Pontius Pilate's act of washing his hands of the crucifixion of
Jesus. Pilate wanted to divest himself of connection with and
responsibility for Jesus' death, and his hand washing was
symbolic of his intention to keep clear of it. One could make the
case that Catholic institutions have a moral obligation to keep
their hands clean of association with the pro-choice political
movement and that granting an honorary degree to someone who
is known to be pro-choice violates this obligation.'
I think that the better argument against honoring pro-choice
politicians rests on this point, not on the idea that it actually
gives scandal in the technical sense. The idea that it is morally
important to distance ourselves from actions that we properly
regard as wrong is well entrenched in Catholic moral thinking in
the form of the principle of cooperation, to which I will return
later. But let me just point out that if the problem lies with the
association itself, then it will be necessary for those who oppose
pro-choice speakers to let go of the idea that the objection to
President Obama or Justice Breyer is not personal. The objection
is most definitely personal because it rests on the assumption
that there is something morally troubling about the individual
himself or herself. This is not necessarily a problem for the view,
but it is important to be clear about the nature of the objection.
' Other forms of association, such as inviting a pro-choice politician to speak as
part of a panel discussion, might not violate this obligation, or violate it to the same
extent.
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The objection is to the person and his or her views, and the claim
is that a Catholic institution should not honor such a person. It
is the association with the person in that context that creates the
dirty hands problem, and it is impossible to explain that without
identifying what it is about the person, his actions, or his
opinions that demands distance.
Of course, not everyone has the qualifications or credentials
necessary to be an appropriate recipient of an honorary degree;
indeed, most of us do not. Such speakers are expected to have
accomplished important things or exemplify admirable traits.
Bestowing an honorary degree implies that the recipient has
done something or is someone worth admiring in this particular
way.6 Let us suppose, not implausibly, that both President
Obama and Justice Breyer meet the general criteria for
having accomplishments worthy of an honorary degree. What
disqualifies them is that their support for abortion rights renders
them guilty of a crucial moral failing in the eyes of the Church.
This is not the polite way of putting the point, but it is, I think,
the most accurate way. The most vocal critics of Obama's
presence at Notre Dame may have been lacking in civility, but
they were at least candid about what they found so objectionable
about him.
On what grounds is it possible to argue that support for
legalized abortion is a moral failing? At a minimum, the claim
must be that the person who votes for pro-choice legislation or
expresses support for the legality of abortion is making a serious
moral mistake, one for which he or she is properly held culpable.
The mistake must be so serious or so fundamental that it
demands that a Catholic institution steer clear of the association
with that person expressed by awarding him or her an honorary
degree, regardless of what other good things the person may have
accomplished. It must be a mistake that reveals not simply
ignorance but something deeply troubling about the person's
character.
Those who oppose commencement speakers on these grounds
have sometimes pointed out that we do apply this standard to
speakers who hold morally abhorrent views about which there is
6 It has been argued that it would be better for colleges and universities to
eschew famous political figures altogether in favor of lesser known, but perhaps even
more admirable, private individuals. Having sat through many commencement
speeches, I sympathize with that view, but I will set it aside for the moment.
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more general agreement. No Catholic institution would honor an
active member of the Ku Klux Klan, no matter how many
corporal works of mercy he had racked up. Catholics across the
political spectrum would likely feel very comfortable in
attributing moral blame to the Klan member for having the
views that he does. We judge that his problem lies in his moral
character, that his views are evidence of a warped moral outlook,
and that in acting on those views, he engages in gravely sinful
behavior. The moral outlook of a Klan member is reprehensible
by the light of Catholic teaching, and this is clearly a sufficient
reason to disqualify him as a speaker. Given the centrality of the
abortion issue, might not the same be said about a pro-choice
speaker?
In the Catholic tradition, opposition to abortion is grounded
in what can only be described as a bedrock principle that
intentionally killing innocent human beings is always morally
wrong. This principle admits of no exceptions; what people tend
to think of as exceptions are not in fact exceptions to the
principle. Rather, they are cases where the principle does not
apply. Thus, when questions arise about whether a particular
procedure can be used to treat an ectopic pregnancy, the issue is
not whether the procedure is an instance of justified abortion but
whether it is an abortion at all. The matter is settled, at least in
theory, by determining whether the action counts as aiming at
death. Aiming at death is always wrong; where killing is
justified, it is justified only insofar as it is aiming at something
other than death.
This way of reasoning, familiar to many in the form of
the principle of double effect, has very broad applicability in the
Catholic moral tradition. Among other things, it helps
distinguish effective pain treatment from euthanasia and
terrorism from justified use of force. The principle of double
effect is important in the Catholic moral tradition precisely
because of the centrality of the underlying prohibition against
aiming at death. Aiming at death is wrong because it is
fundamentally incompatible with respecting the full dignity of
each human being. Double effect helps us sort out when an
action is aiming at death and when it is not. The Catholic
Church's view is that by definition, all abortions are aiming at
the death of an innocent human being and, thus, violate the
prohibition against intentional killing.
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In the eyes of the Church, the intentional killing of innocents
is both intrinsically evil, meaning that there are no
circumstances in which it could ever be good, and gravely evil,
meaning that it is a very serious moral wrong. Not all intrinsic
evils are gravely evil, and not all grave evils are intrinsically
evil.' When it comes to abortion, the public focus tends to be on
the idea that it is intrinsically evil. This is understandable but
misplaced. In fact, it is the idea that intentional killing is
gravely evil that does the heavy lifting in arguments against pro-
choice honorees.
It is often said that groups protesting honorees at Catholic
institutions focus too narrowly on abortion, to the exclusion of
equally important moral issues. This criticism is partly justified
and partly unjustified. It is unjustified because there are very
few actions, if any, that compare in gravity to the intentional
killing of innocents.8 It is justified because abortion is not the
only form of intentional killing around and also because
intentional killing is not the only kind of grave evil around.
Serious, deliberate violations of human dignity are widespread,
and the Church has reason to object to them all.9
In the Catholic natural law tradition, moral truths such as
the gravely evil nature of intentional killing, are accessible via
natural human reason, as well as through Church teaching. In
other words, one can come to know them via the Church, but the
Church is not the only route to this knowledge. The implication
is that the Catholic Church should be able to offer non-
theological arguments for all of its moral claims, including the
claim that abortion isgravely wrong This ability offers an
enormous advantage, both because it makes possible substantive
moral engagement with people who do not share the Catholic
faith and also because it enables the Church to hold non-
Catholics responsible for the moral principles that they accept.
And yet it also poses an enormous responsibility. The Church
shoulders a burden, which it has always gladly taken on, of
developing sound arguments based in human reason for each
On this distinction, see M. Cathleen Kaveny, Intrinsic Evil and Political
Responsibility, AMERICA, Oct. 27, 2008, at 16.
The Catholic Church wisely refrains from ranking evils, but killing is
undoubtedly high up on the list.
9 Indeed, most reflective Catholics opposing pro-choice honorees also oppose
honorees who support torture, indiscriminate use of force in war, and so forth.
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moral position that it espouses. It is thus fair to question the
extent to which the Church has succeeded in making its views on
abortion plausible to those who have no reason to accept those
views on faith alone.
The short answer, I think, is that the Church has not
succeeded in making those views plausible to people outside its
own tradition and, indeed, even to many people within it. I say
this not to fault Catholic theologians and philosophers; certainly,
there have been valiant and sophisticated efforts at constructing
such arguments, many of which have been largely ignored by the
secular world. And yet, thoughtful, reflective people remain
divided on the topic. The division is not because some people
take the view that it is permissible to intentionally kill innocent
human beings. Rather, it is because those people do not accept
the claim that an embryo or a fetus is a human being with full
dignity. The Church is committed to the claim that this is a
truth accessible to human reason. The best arguments in
support of this view rely in part on scientific facts about
embryology and fetal development, most of which are not really
in dispute. The dispute is over the moral significance we attach
to those scientific facts.
I am not suggesting that there can be no argument that can
take us from the facts of human development to the moral claim
that embryos and fetuses are full human persons. But it is quite
plainly true that there are many reflective people of good will
who are not convinced by even the best attempts at such
arguments and many others who are unaware of those
arguments.10 Indeed, they have arguments of their own. Some of
those arguments are rooted in compassion and sympathy for the
plight of women who find themselves unhappily pregnant. Some
of them are rooted in compelling intuitions about what we see as
our obligations toward, say, toddlers in need of rescue from a
burning building versus our obligations toward embryos in a
similar position. Many people who hold these arguments are
people of good will who have thought very seriously and
reflectively about this issue but still find the pro-life arguments
inadequately convincing.
1o I do not think we can consider it a moral flaw in someone that she is not
combing academic journals for the latest developments in Catholic moral theology.
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What is the appropriate moral stance to take toward
someone who is not convinced about the truth of a moral claim?
This is a question to which there can be no universal, easily
applicable answer. The Catholic moral framework is not, of
course, a relativistic one. The moral truths on which the Church
relies do not vary according to time, place, or standpoint. But it
is one thing for a moral claim to be true and another thing for it
to be obviously true. A brief look at history suffices to show that
what now seem like obvious moral truths, such as that human
beings have equal moral standing regardless of their race, were
not obvious to everyone in the past, including the moral leaders
of the Church."1 What we have in the debate over abortion is a
moral claim, the truth of which is clearly not obvious to everyone,
including many reflective people of good will.
Recognizing this shows the limitations of the analogy with
honoring a Ku Klux Klan member. In our society, we no longer
have serious moral debates about the equality of African-
Americans. This means that honoring the Klan member today is
relevantly different from honoring a pro-choice politician today.
A better analogy would be with honoring a Klan member during
a time period where there was serious moral debate over racial
equality. But even then, the analogy is misleading. A Klan
member would have likely been an active participant in direct
assaults against the dignity of African-Americans. But a pro-
choice politician is not, by virtue of voting for pro-choice
legislation, an active participant in any direct abortion. The
correct analogy, then, is with a politician who supports his
government's racist policies and laws. Would a Catholic
institution have been wrong to honor such a politician in the
1940s? I myself do not think the answer to this question is self-
evident, nor can we answer it by reference to our current moral
framework. We would need to adopt the moral framework extant
in the 1940s, and that is not an easy thing for us to do seventy
years later. But we can say that the answer would depend, as it
does now, on what the institution was honoring the politician for
and how closely the politician had identified himself and his life's
work with those racist policies.
" Indeed, one of Martin Luther King Jr.'s greatest strengths as an orator was
his skill at making this particular moral truth obvious.
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I will take for granted that no Catholic institution could
possibly honor someone who had, as his or her primary career or
personal objective, the continued legalization of abortion and
expansion of its availability. In such a case, it would be hard to
see what about the person's career the honorary degree could
possibly be honoring. I will also take for granted, although I
know that some will not, that there is no difficulty in honoring
someone like Bart Stupak or Douglas Kmiec, who publicly
denounces abortion and can justifiably claim to be committed to
minimizing or ending it.12 The much harder cases are the ones in
between, where the person has not taken on abortion rights
advocacy as a major commitment but has also not explicitly
rejected or opposed abortion rights. It is further complicated
when such people, like Justice Breyer and President Obama,
have the power to produce direct effects on abortion law or policy.
Then the question becomes whether they can be said to be
employing judgment over political matters in a defensible way.
The exercise of moral judgment in the context of political
decision making is structured by a number of competing moral
considerations, and there is no obvious sorting mechanism that
will enable us to put those considerations in a neatly organized,
exceptionless order. The Church has always recognized this
feature of moral judgment, evidenced by its reliance on the
ancient and medieval virtue tradition. In that tradition, largely
drawn from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the central virtue of
practical wisdom-more commonly, but also more misleadingly,
called prudence-is essential to the practice of moral judgment in
particular contexts. The virtue of practical wisdom is the
exercise of human wisdom about practical matters, where that
wisdom is oriented and directed by true convictions about the
good for human beings. The practically wise person is capable of
sorting through the messiness of actual human problems and
discerning the course of action that best honors and promotes
that good.
Consider the venerable principle of cooperation. A
fundamental moral principle in Catholic thought is that we must
never intend evil. In theory, that sounds easy enough, but, of
12 The Cardinal Newman Society routinely objects not only to honoring people
who are clearly pro-life but also to those who are Democrats or supporters of
Democratic policies, like health-care reform. I can see no plausible argument for this
position.
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course, in practice things are not so simple. The pursuit of
morally good aims may require compromises that bring us closer
to evil than we would like. The function of the principle of
cooperation is to help us discern when we are getting too close.
Formal cooperation, in which we take up the evil end as our own,
is strictly forbidden. Material cooperation, in which we do not
take up the evil end but further it through our actions, is
sometimes warranted and sometimes not, depending on the
nature and gravity of both the evil and the good to be obtained,
as well as the relationship between the person's actions and the
evil outcome. In other words, it requires the discernment that is
the hallmark of practical wisdom.
The Church has made clear that it regards voting in favor of
permissive abortion laws as a potentially morally objectionable
act in itself.13 But when it is morally objectionable, it is not so in
exactly the same way that abortion itself is, although that point
is sometimes lost in the rhetoric. Voting in favor of loosening
restrictions on or providing funding for abortions is simply not a
case of intentional killing on any reasonable account of
intentional action. At most, it is cooperation with intentional
killing, and it is far from clear what kind of cooperation with
abortion a pro-choice voting record represents and what the
implications of it should be for our attitude toward the
cooperators.
Formal cooperation with something gravely wrong, where
the cooperator shares the aim of those engaging in the prohibited
action, is also gravely wrong. But it is possible to vote for a piece
of pro-choice legislation without having anyone's death as one's
aim.14 This point is usually acknowledged on all sides; however,
its importance is often missed or downplayed. It matters
because, while there can be nothing that would justify the act of
intentionally killing an innocent person, there can be something
that would justify the act of permitting such killings to occur. It
is not possible to perform or procure an abortion without
intending a death; it is possible to vote for pro-choice legislation
without intending anyone's death. Although voting for
permissive abortion legislation could count as formal cooperation
with abortion, it need not. Indeed, charity would suggest that
1 See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Forming
Consciences for Faithful Citizenship: A Call to Political Responsibility 11 (2007).
" See id.
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when politicians claim that they themselves oppose abortion but
are voting pro-choice for other reasons, we take them at their
words and assume that they are engaging in, at most, material
cooperation.
Material cooperation comes in different species as well and
certainly not all material cooperation will be justified according
to Church teaching. It depends on the good that is sought and
the distance between the action and the result. A politician who
votes for a broad funding mandate for health care, one that
would have the effect of improving access for pregnant women
and young children, may reasonably think that this will be more
effective in reducing abortion rates than simply outlawing or
restricting access to abortion. Likewise, a politician may throw
his or her weight behind programs that provide affordable, high
quality child care-an important problem on which the Catholic
bishops have, regrettably, largely been silent-on the grounds
that it would help address the financial burdens faced by poor
pregnant women. These are prudential judgments, subject to the
conscientious deliberation of people of good will. This is
sometimes denied by those eager to argue that there can in
principle be nothing that justifies any kind of material
cooperation with abortion. But this argument is a misuse of the
very concept of cooperation and, ultimately, a rejection of the
sophisticated moral framework it represents. The principle of
cooperation recognizes the fact that keeping one's hands perfectly
clean in the messy business of real life is not always an option.
Sometimes, the choice is between dirty hands and total
withdrawal. Church teaching does not specify a priori which
choice must be made.
It is difficult to know whether a given politician who votes
for pro-choice legislation is engaging in formal cooperation or
material cooperation with abortion itself. It is also not easy to
determine just how remote a given instance of material
cooperation is, particularly when it comes to voting for
complicated pieces of legislation with many amendments
attached. To some extent, we need to take people at their word
when they explain their motivations, and, certainly, charity
demands that we presume them to be sincere unless we have
evidence to the contrary. Bart Stupak was roundly castigated by
pro-life factions for having voted in favor of health-care reform,
but it would be difficult to argue that his voting for it could have
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been anything other than very remote material cooperation with
abortion-if even that, given his clear pro-life commitments.
What this complex landscape indicates, I think, is that it is
impossible to judge the moral suitability of a potential honoree
without stepping back and looking at the entirety of the person's
actions and commitments and, moreover, doing so with the
recognition that we live in a complicated world in which
compromises are often demanded, particularly from politicians.
In this sense, the Nobel laureate, whose voting record on abortion
is conducted entirely by secret ballot, has it much easier than the
politician. It is fair for us to hold politicians to high moral
standards but unfair not to acknowledge that they, unlike most
of us, must act on their beliefs in a very public way. The simplest
way to keep one's hands clean is never to enter the fray at all,
which is what most of the rest of us do. Not all politicians are
noble, but the Church has always regarded the pursuit of the
common good as a noble aim. Politicians who take on that
extraordinarily difficult task and do so with good will deserve our
good will in return, not cynicism and scorn. We have a duty to
look at their records with a charitable eye, recognizing and
sympathizing with the difficult position with respect to voting in
which they so often find themselves. We have a duty not to
assume too quickly that they are mistaken in their prudential
judgments or being insincere when they express a willingness to
seek common ground. We have a duty to acknowledge the
genuine constraints imposed by other obligations, such as the
duty of a Supreme Court Justice to abide by defensible standards
of judicial decision making. The vitriol surrounding the current
debate about honorees is deeply at odds with these duties, and
the cynicism underlying it has no place in a robust Catholic
political culture.
I have not presented an argument that would enable us to
draw any straightforward conclusions about whether Notre
Dame and Fordham erred by honoring President Obama and
Justice Breyer, respectively. My own view is that they did not
err. This is in part because I do not think that presenting
someone with an honor or honorary degree generates all that
much of an association with that person. Certainly, it does not
constitute an embrace of everything that they have ever done,
said, or thought. I also think that the portrayal of President
Obama as the leader of the pro-choice movement and an avid
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supporter of abortion was exaggerated for effect by his opponents
and reflects the cynicism I denounced in the previous
paragraph." But I take seriously the fact that people whose
judgment I respect think differently on this matter and that
reflective, charitable opposition to honoring President Obama
and Justice Breyer is possible. I deny only that it is necessary.
In the end, Catholics are called to bring to the political arena
the Church's entire moral arsenal and deploy it as
conscientiously as possible in what we surely must grant is a
flawed and broken world. We are also called to respect the
efforts of other people of good will, Catholic or not, similarly
engaged in the project of mending and restoring human dignity
in such a world. In the opening lines of Caritas in Veritate, Pope
Benedict XVI describes love as "an extraordinary force which
leads people to opt for courageous and generous engagement in
the field of justice and peace."'6 Courage and generosity are not
at odds; we can have the courage of our convictions while
remaining generous to those who reject those convictions.
Reflection on the history of our country's moral development
should make us both humble about our own powers of
discernment but also hopeful for the future. We do not always
know what is true, but if we are lucky, in time, we will together
find out. Meanwhile, we would do well to proceed in a spirit of
gentleness, humility, and, above all, charity.
"6 This works both ways-many opponents of awards and honorary degrees to
George W. Bush and Alberto Gonzales were guilty of the same offenses.
16 BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CARITAS IN VERITATE 1 (2009).
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